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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
  
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 This case arises out of the termination of a motor 
carrier contract.  The plaintiffs, Siegel Transfer, Inc., Robin 
Express Transfer, Inc., and Joruss Trucking, Inc., alleged that 
the contract's termination and subsequent refusals to deal on the 
part of the defendants, Bethlehem Steel Corporation and its 
subsidiaries, Bethran, Inc. and Carrier Express, Inc., violated 
section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.  The 
plaintiffs also charged the defendants with violations of the 
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq., and the 
Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 11901-11903, 11915-11916, and with 
several state law causes of action.  The plaintiffs now appeal 
the district court's decision to grant the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment and motion to dismiss.  The issues we address 
are whether the companies in the Bethlehem Steel corporate family 
and their agents were legally capable of engaging in an antitrust 
conspiracy with each other, whether the plaintiffs had a private 
right of action under the federal transportation statutes, and 
whether the defendants breached the parties' agreement. 
 In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), 
we hold that the defendants were legally incapable of conspiring 
with one another or with their agents.  We also find that neither 
the Interstate Commerce Act nor the Elkins Act authorizes the 
plaintiffs to file a private cause of action in a federal court.  
Finally, we conclude that the defendants are not liable for 
  
breach of contract.  Thus, we will affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
 
 I. 
 We begin our analysis by reviewing the evidence 
presented in this case.  In considering a motion for summary 
judgment, a court does not resolve factual disputes or make 
credibility determinations, and must view facts and inferences in 
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.  Big 
Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 
1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 1262 
(1993).   
 Siegel Transfer, Robin Express, and Joruss Trucking 
were owned by Russell Siegel and his wife, and were based in 
Sparrows Point, Maryland.  Siegel Transfer, a motor contract 
carrier,1 hauled steel, lumber, telephone poles and heavy 
                     
1
.   Under the Interstate Commerce Act, motor carriers fall 
into two defined categories:  motor common carriers and motor 
contract carriers: 
 
 § 10102.  Definitions 
 
 In this subtitle -- 
 
   (14) "motor common carrier" means a person 
holding itself out to the general public to 
provide motor vehicle transportation for 
compensation over regular or irregular 
routes, or both.   
 
   (15) "motor contract carrier" means -- 
 
    (A) a person, other than a motor 
common carrier, providing motor vehicle 
transportation of passengers for 
  
equipment for various shippers; Robin Express leased trucks, 
trailers and drivers to Siegel Transfer and other carriers; and 
Joruss Trucking also leased trucks to Siegel Transfer.  
 In 1985, Bethlehem Steel made plans to acquire two 
motor carriers, Bethran and Carrier Express, through its 
subsidiary, the Philadelphia Bethlehem and New England Railroad.  
While Bethlehem Steel did not anticipate that it would satisfy 
all of its transportation needs by acquiring these carriers, it 
hoped to capture at least a portion of the revenue it was paying 
to outside truckers. 
(..continued) 
compensation under continuing 
agreements with a person or a limited 
number of persons--- 
 
     (i) by assigning motor vehicles 
for a continuing period of time 
for the exclusive use of each 
such person; or 
 
     (ii) designed to meet the 
distinct needs of each such 
person; and 
 
    (B) a person providing motor vehicle 
transportation of property for 
compensation under continuing 
agreements with one or more persons-- 
 
     (i) by assigning motor vehicles 
for a continuing period of time 
for the exclusive use of each 
such person; or  
 
     (ii) designed to meet the 
distinct needs of each such 
person. 
 
49 U.S.C. § 10102(14),(15). 
  
 Because section 11341 of the Interstate Commerce Act 
gives the Interstate Commerce Commission exclusive authority to 
oversee acquisitions of this type, Bethlehem and the Railroad 
filed a petition, requesting permission to acquire control2 of 
Bethran and Carrier Express, without having to engage in the 
Commission's prior approval process.  Section 11343(e) authorizes 
the Commission to exempt an acquisition from regulatory oversight 
if it finds that regulation is not necessary to carry out the 
transportation policy of the Act,3 and the acquisition is limited 
in scope or unlikely to result in an abuse of market power.  49 
U.S.C. § 11343(e).  Finding that the proposed acquisition met 
these criteria, the Commission exempted it from the Act's prior 
approval requirements.  Under section 13341, the Commission's 
exemption not only authorized the parties to proceed with the 
acquisition, but immunized it from the antitrust laws as well.  
49 U.S.C. § 13341.  Once the acquisition was finalized, Bethlehem 
Steel owned 99.92% (8,993 of 9,000 shares) of the Railroad's 
                     
2
.   The Act defines "control" in pertinent part as "actual 
control, legal control, and the power to exercise control, 
through or by (A) common directors, officers, stockholders, a 
voting trust, or a holding or investment company, or (B) any 
other means."  49 U.S.C. § 10102(7). 
3
.   The Act aims to recognize and preserve the inherent 
advantages of various modes of transportation; promote safe, 
economical and efficient transportation; encourage sound economic 
conditions among carriers; encourage the establishment and 
maintenance of reasonable rates without unreasonable 
discrimination or unfair or destructive competitive practices; 
coordinate federal and state efforts on transportation matters; 
and encourage fair wages and working conditions in the 
transportation industry.  49 U.S.C. § 10101. 
  
stock;4 the Railroad owned 100% of Bethran's stock; and Bethran 
owned 100% of Carrier Express' stock. 
 Carrier Express, already a licensed common and contract 
carrier, obtained broker authority from the Commission.  
Organized to operate without exit barriers, Carrier Express did 
not hire employees, acquire equipment or engage its own drivers.  
Instead, it used commissioned, non-exclusive agents in different 
parts of the country to make arrangements with owner-operators or 
with other carriers who had access to trucks and drivers to carry 
the freight it was under contract to transport.  The agents made 
hauling arrangements with whomever Carrier Express authorized to 
transport its freight.   
 Carrier Express operations were managed by Oak 
Management, Inc.  Under the parties' contract, Oak Management 
oversaw all of Carrier Express' day-to-day functions and received 
a percentage of Carrier Express' revenues as payment for its 
services.  Thomas Rediehs, a Vice President of Carrier Express, 
was the owner and President of Oak Management, and Kermit Bryan 
was Oak Management's Executive Vice President. 
 Oak Management also managed the operations of Rediehs 
Express, a motor common carrier, motor contract carrier and 
broker.  Rediehs' wife and children owned Rediehs Express, and 
Bryan was its Operations Manager.  Rediehs Express hauled 
                     
4
.   The seven shares of stock that Bethlehem Steel did not 
own were issued in the name of the Railroad's current officers, 
and could not be sold or transferred.  Whenever the Railroad 
replaced an officer, the stock was reissued in the new officer's 
name.       
  
Bethlehem Steel products from Bethlehem Steel's plant located in 
Burns Harbor, Indiana, and did some business with Carrier 
Express. 
          Under its motor contract carrier operating authority, 
Carrier Express entered into a contract dated January 15, 1986 
with Bethlehem Steel, agreeing to transport Bethlehem Steel goods 
at given rates.  In July, 1988, a contract between Bethlehem 
Steel and Bethran was assigned to Carrier Express,5 which 
obligated Carrier Express to refund to Bethlehem Steel a sum 
equal to 5% of the total revenue it received for transporting 
Bethlehem Steel freight.   
 In late 1985, Siegel Transfer, Carrier Express and 
"Bethran doing business as Carrier [Express]" executed a 
"Contract for Transportation of Property Between A Motor Carrier 
Broker [Carrier Express] and a Motor Contract Carrier [Siegel 
Transfer] In Accordance With the Provisions of 49 C.F.R. 1053."  
The contract took effect on January 4, 1986, and after an initial 
term of three years, remained in effect from year to year, 
subject to the right of either party to terminate upon thirty 
days' written notice.  Under the contract, Carrier Express was 
obligated to offer Siegel Transfer a minimum of 30,000 pounds of 
authorized commodities per year for transport and to pay Siegel 
Transfer 90% of the freight rate received by Carrier Express from 
the shipper.  Russell Siegel was named a Carrier Express agent 
for the Baltimore area and agreed to receive a 6% commission from 
                     
5
.   In July, 1988, Bethran ceased motor carrier operations.  
  
Carrier Express on the loads he arranged for shipment by 
companies other than Siegel Transfer.   
          While the contract was in effect, Siegel Transfer 
transported Bethlehem Steel goods received from Carrier Express 
almost exclusively out of Bethlehem Steel's Sparrows Point plant.  
As to the Bethlehem Steel freight offered by Carrier Express to 
Siegel Transfer for transport, the 5% refund that Carrier Express 
owed to Bethlehem Steel was paid from the 10% of the freight rate 
Carrier Express retained, not from the 90% of the freight rate 
that Siegel Transfer was paid.   
          In 1988, while carrying freight received from Carrier 
Express, a Siegel Transfer vehicle was involved in a serious 
accident in Alabama.  Joined in the lawsuit which followed, 
Carrier Express paid a substantial sum of money to settle the 
claims brought against it.  That same year, another Siegel 
Transfer vehicle was involved in another serious accident in 
Georgia.  In December of 1989, Carrier Express was temporarily 
suspended from transporting goods for Bethlehem Steel because 
Siegel Transfer had violated Bethlehem Steel's loading and weight 
limit rules.  
 James C. Matthews, Vice-President of Carrier Express 
and Bethran, was aware of and concerned about these incidents.  
In 1989, Matthews decided to terminate Carrier Express' contract 
with Siegel Transfer.  This decision was based, according to 
Matthews, on his unwillingness to expose Carrier Express to the 
continued risks of doing business with Siegel Transfer.  Matthews 
  
spoke of his intention to terminate the contract with Carl 
Eckenrode, the President of Bethran, Carrier Express and the 
Railroad, and a Bethran director; Steven Mollman, Bethran's 
operations manager and one of its directors; and William Van 
Heel, a district transportation manager of Bethlehem Steel and a 
Bethran director.  Additionally, Matthews informed Rediehs and 
Bryan of his decision.  Believing that Carrier Express would not 
be able to find owner-operators or carriers to perform the 
hauling that Siegel Transfer was handling and would, therefore, 
suffer a loss of revenue and profit, Rediehs argued against the 
termination. 
 Matthews, Rediehs, Bryan and Van Heel convened on 
January 4, 1990 at Bethlehem Steel's Sparrows Point plant to 
inform Siegel that Carrier Express' contract with Siegel Transfer 
was terminated.  Prior to their speaking personally with Siegel, 
Rediehs again voiced his opposition to the termination.  
Matthews, however, refused to alter his decision.  Consequently, 
when Siegel arrived at the meeting, he was told of the 
termination, and later that day, received written notice from 
Matthews. 
 During the thirty-day notice period which followed, 
Carrier Express offered Siegel Transfer over 600,000 pounds of 
freight to transport.  At Carrier Express' direction, Oak 
Management commenced instructing Carrier Express agents that the 
contract with Siegel Transfer had been terminated and that Siegel 
Transfer was no longer authorized to carry Carrier Express 
freight.  As an accommodation to Carrier Express, Oak Management 
  
assumed responsibility for the Baltimore Carrier Express agency 
at a 4% commission rate, but only reluctantly, expecting that the 
agency would be unprofitable.  Just as Rediehs had anticipated, 
Carrier Express was unable to find trucks to replace those that 
Siegel Transfer had made available; the amount of freight that 
Carrier Express transported out of Sparrow Point decreased and 
its revenues declined.  Oak Management, in turn, suffered a 
financial loss.  Moreover, Oak Management lost money as Carrier 
Express' Baltimore agent and relinquished the position in 1991. 
 Shortly after the contract's termination, Robin Express 
leased all of its trucks and drivers to Ligon Nationwide, a 
trucking company of substantial size.  Under the arrangement with 
Ligon Nationwide, which lasted for approximately one year, Robin 
Express trucks were used to transport freight for several 
shippers, including Bethlehem Steel.  During this time, one of 
the Bethlehem Steel district transportation superintendents, for 
whom Siegel Transfer's safety record was unacceptable, advised an 
agent for Glass Container, a motor carrier, not to use Siegel 
equipment to haul products from the Bethlehem Steel rod mill 
located in Sparrows Point. 
            In February, 1990, Siegel Transfer relinquished its 
contract carrier operating authority and ceased doing business; 
Joruss Trucking suspended operations in July, 1990.  In November 
1990, Robin Express entered into lease agreements with other 
truckers, who used Robin Express trucks and drivers to carry 
loads for Bethlehem Steel and a number of other shippers.  Unable 
  
to secure a sufficient amount of business, however, Robin Express 
ceased to operate in 1991. 
 On December 23, 1992, Siegel Transfer, Robin Express 
and Joruss Trucking commenced this action against Carrier 
Express, Bethran and Bethlehem Steel.  On February 15, 1994, the 
plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, asserting two federal 
causes of action, one under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1 (Count I), and the other under the Interstate Commerce 
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq., and the Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 
11901-11903, 11915-11916 (Count XI), as well as several state law 
claims:  violations of the Maryland Antitrust Act (Count II), 
breach of contract (Counts III and IV), breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith (Counts VII and VIII), promissory estoppel 
(Count VI) and civil conspiracy (Count XI).   
 On March 21, 1994, the defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss the plaintiffs' Interstate Commerce Act and Elkins Act 
claims or, in the alternative, to refer them to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, and a motion for summary judgment on the 
plaintiffs' other claims.  On July 1, 1994, the district court 
dismissed the federal transportation law claims, concluding that 
neither the Interstate Commerce Act nor the Elkins Act gave the 
plaintiffs a private right of action.  Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. 
Carrier Express, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 990, 1002-05 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
The court also granted summary judgment in the defendants' favor 
on the plaintiffs' remaining claims, with the exception of Count 
  
VI for promissory estoppel.6  On the antitrust and civil 
conspiracy claims, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed 
to show that "two or more economic actors" conspired against 
them, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Copperweld Corp. 
v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).  856 F. Supp. at 
995-1002, 1005, 1009.  As to the contract and implied duty of 
good faith claims, the court rejected the plaintiffs' theory of 
breach, finding it contrary to the clear and unambiguous language 
of the parties' agreement.  Id. at 1005-06, 1008-09.   
 On August 22, 1994, judgment was entered for the 
defendants, and on September 8, 1994, the plaintiffs filed an 
appeal.  We will first address the federal antitrust issues this 
appeal raises, the federal transportation law issues second, and 
the state law questions third. 
 
 II. 
 Summary judgment may present the district court with an 
opportunity to dispose of meritless cases and avoid wasteful 
trials.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1985).  
This is true even in antitrust cases "where motive and intent 
play leading roles, proof is largely in the hands of alleged 
conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot."  Big Apple 
                     
6
.   Finding genuine issues of disputed fact, the district 
court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to 
the promissory estoppel claim.  Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier 
Express, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 990, 1007-08 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  On 
August 22, 1994, a stipulation and order dismissing this claim 
without prejudice was entered. 
  
BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1362 (3d 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 1262 (1993), 
quoting Pollar v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 
464, 473 (1962). 
 Summary judgment must be granted where no genuine issue 
of material fact exists for resolution at trial and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c).  On summary judgment, the moving party need not 
disprove the opposing party's claim, but does have the burden to 
show the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.  
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.  If the movant meets this burden, then 
the opponent may not rest on allegations in pleadings, but must 
counter with specific facts which demonstrate that there exists a 
genuine issue for trial.  Id.  As in this case, when the 
nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the 
moving party may meet its burden by showing that the nonmoving 
party has not offered evidence sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to its case.  Id. at 322.  We 
remain mindful that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a 
court must assess the material facts against the proof required 
of the plaintiff on substantive issues.   
 
 III. 
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part 
that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . 
is declared to be illegal."  15 U.S.C. § 1.  For a section 1 
  
claim under the Sherman Act, "a plaintiff must prove `concerted 
action,' a collective reference to the `contract . . . 
combination or conspiracy.'"  Big Apple, 974 F.2d 1364, quoting 
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 445 (3d Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).  "Unilateral action, no 
matter what its motivation, cannot violate [section] 1."  Edward 
J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 110 (3d 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).  A "`unity of 
purpose or a common design and understanding or a meeting of the 
minds in an unlawful arrangement' must exist to trigger section 1 
liability."  Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771, quoting American 
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946).  Proof of 
concerted action requires evidence that two or more distinct 
entities agreed to take action against a plaintiff.  Weiss v. 
York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786, 813 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
470 U.S. 1060 (1985).  
 Here the plaintiffs assert that Bethlehem Steel, 
Bethran and Carrier Express, with several unnamed co-
conspirators, combined to eliminate the plaintiffs and stifle 
competition among motor contract carriers transporting steel 
products in the traffic lanes out of and back to Bethlehem 
Steel's Sparrow Point plant.  While it is difficult to derive 
from the plaintiffs' pleadings and proof who participated in a 
conspiracy to achieve this goal, we understand them to contend 
that the companies in the Bethlehem Steel corporate family joined 
with Oak Management to terminate the Carrier Express contract 
with Siegel Transfer, and thereafter, enlisted assistance from 
  
Oak Management, Thomas Rediehs, Kermit Bryan, Carrier Express 
field agents, other motor carrier agents, and Rediehs Express to 
deny them the opportunity to haul products for Bethlehem Steel.  
The plaintiffs' evidence of concerted action with regard to 
contract termination is the meeting the representatives of 
Bethlehem Steel, Bethran, Carrier Express and Oak Management held 
on January 4, 1990 to inform Russell Siegel that Siegel 
Transfer's contract with Carrier Express would not be renewed; 
their evidence of a concerted refusal to deal are the post-
termination contacts Oak Management had with Carrier Express 
agents to advise them that Siegel Transfer was no longer 
authorized to haul Carrier Express freight, and the directive 
from a Bethlehem Steel district transportation superintendent to 
a Glass Container agent not to use Siegel equipment to transport 
Bethlehem Steel goods.  The plaintiffs also contend that the 5% 
refund Carrier Express paid to Bethlehem Steel is a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act. 
 Before we evaluate the plaintiffs' evidence, we will 
address the threshold issue of conspiratorial capacity in order 
to determine who among the defendants and their alleged co-
conspirators, if anyone, could participate in an antitrust 
conspiracy.   
 Until the Supreme Court's decision in Copperweld Corp. 
v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), related 
corporations were generally perceived as separate entities 
capable of concerted activity, a view which came to be known as 
the "intra-enterprise conspiracy" doctrine.  Id. at 759.  In 
  
Copperweld, however, the Supreme Court considered whether a 
parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary are legally 
capable of conspiring with one another under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, and determined that they are not.  Id. at 759-77.  
The fundamental question the Court confronted was whether an 
agreement between a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary 
represents the conduct of one economic actor or two.   
 In its opinion, the Court acknowledged that the Sherman 
Act contains a basic distinction between concerted and 
independent action, and discussed the reason why Congress chose 
to treat concerted behavior more strictly: 
 Concerted activity inherently is fraught with 
anticompetitive risk.  It deprives the 
marketplace of the independent centers of 
decisionmaking that competition assumes and 
demands.  In any conspiracy, two or more 
entities that previously pursued their own 
interests separately are combining to act as 
one for their common benefit.  This not only 
reduces the diverse directions in which 
economic power is aimed but suddenly 
increases the economic power moving in one 
particular direction. 
 
Id. at 768-69. 
 The Court then noted that although "[n]othing in the 
literal meaning of [the] terms [of section 1] excludes 
coordinated conduct among officers or employees of the same 
company", it is obvious that an "internal `agreement' to 
implement a single firm's policies does not raise the antitrust 
dangers that [section] 1 was designed to police."  Id. at 769 
(emphasis in original). 
  
 Recognizing that section 1 is not violated by the 
internally coordinated conduct of a corporation and one of its 
unincorporated divisions because such conduct is essentially 
undertaken by one economic actor pursuing a single firm's 
interests and goals, the Court stated: 
 Although this Court has not previously 
addressed the question, there can be little 
doubt that the operations of a corporate 
enterprise organized into divisions must be 
judged as the conduct of a single actor. 
. . .  A division within a corporate 
structure pursues the common interests of the 
whole rather than interests separate from 
those of the corporation itself . . . . 
Because coordination between a corporation 
and its division does not represent a sudden 
joining of two independent sources of 
economic power previously pursuing separate 
interests, it is not an activity that 
warrants § 1 scrutiny. 
 
Id. at 770-71 (footnote omitted). 
 Similarly, the Court concluded that given the control a 
parent wields over its wholly owned subsidiary, these parties 
always share a "unity of purpose or a common design", and thus, 
cannot engage in section 1 concerted activity: 
 A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have 
a complete unity of interest.  Their 
objectives are common, not disparate; their 
general corporate actions are guided or 
determined not by two separate corporate 
consciousnesses, but one. . . .  If a parent 
and a wholly owned subsidiary do "agree" to a 
course of action, there is no sudden joining 
of economic resources that had previously 
served different interests, and there is no 
justification for § 1 scrutiny. . . . 
 
 [I]n reality a parent and a wholly owned 
subsidiary always have a "unity of purpose or 
a common design."  They share a common 
  
purpose whether or not the parent keeps a 
tight rein over the subsidiary; the parent 
may assert full control at any moment if the 
subsidiary fails to act in the parent's best 
interests. 
 
Id. at 771-72 (footnote omitted)(emphasis in original). 
 
 Although the Court limited its holding to the case of a 
parent and wholly owned subsidiary, it nonetheless encouraged the 
courts to analyze the substance, not the form, of economic 
arrangements when faced with allegations of intra-corporate 
conspiracies: 
  The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine 
looks to the form of an enterprise's 
structure and ignores the reality.  Antitrust 
liability should not depend on whether a 
corporate subunit is organized as an 
unincorporated division or a wholly owned 
subsidiary.  A corporation has complete power 
to maintain a wholly owned subsidiary in 
either form.  The economic, legal, or other 
considerations that lead corporate management 
to choose one structure over the other are 
not relevant to whether the enterprise's 
conduct seriously threatens competition.      
 
Id. at 772-73 (footnote omitted). 
  
 IV. 
 A. 
 We turn now to examine the evidence proffered by the 
plaintiffs in response to the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment and their supporting evidence. 
 
1.   The Alleged Conspiracy Among the Bethlehem Steel 
 Companies                                        
 
  
 It is undisputed that, with the exception of the 
Railroad, the Bethlehem Steel companies were wholly owned by the 
parent company.  Although Bethlehem Steel did not own .08% of the 
Railroad's stock, the difference between its 99.92% ownership and 
the 100% ownership in Copperweld is de minimus.  See Satellite 
Financial Planning Corp. v. First Nat'l. Bank, 633 F. Supp. 386, 
395 (D. Del.), aff'd on reconsideration, 643 F. Supp. 449 (1986) 
(the de minimus difference between 99% plus ownership and 100% 
ownership does not diminish Copperweld's applicability).7  The 
plaintiffs have not shown why an absolute rule of 100% ownership 
must be applied in this case.8  
 Moreover, it is also beyond dispute that Bethlehem 
Steel, with 8,993 of the Railroad's 9,000 outstanding shares of 
                     
7
.   The courts have not only applied Copperweld in cases 
involving de minimus deviations from 100% ownership, but have 
also extended its principles to situations where parental 
ownership was in the 80% to 91.9% range.  Stephen Calkins, 
Copperweld in the Courts:  The Road to Caribe, 63 Antitrust L.J. 
345, 351-41 (1995) (reviewing and commenting on the several 
categories of judicial treatment of Copperweld).  
8
.   The plaintiffs argue that the mere fact that Bethlehem 
Steel did not wholly own the Railroad requires that we reject 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), 
and instead, seek guidance from the Supreme Court's decision in 
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). In 
Copperweld, the Supreme Court suggested that Yellow Cab may stand 
"for a narrow rule based on the original illegality of the 
affiliation" between a parent and its subsidiary.  467 U.S. at 
762 n. 6.  Even this "narrow rule" does not apply:  the 
plaintiffs did not challenge Bethlehem Steel's original 
acquisition of Bethran and Carrier Express on antitrust grounds; 
nor do they challenge it here.  We note, also, that the 
Interstate Commerce Commission's order exempting the original 
acquisition from regulation immunized it from the antitrust laws.  
See supra, page 5. 
  
stock, had complete control over the Railroad,9 as well as over 
Bethran and Carrier Express.  Hence, these companies were, in 
substance, one economic unit, incapable of an antitrust 
conspiracy under Copperweld.  See Advanced Health-Care Services, 
Inc. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 
1990) (under Copperweld, two subsidiaries wholly owned by the 
same parent are legally incapable of conspiring with one another 
for purposes of section 1); Century Oil Tool, Inc. v. Production 
Specialties Inc., 737 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1984) (under 
Copperweld, separate corporations commonly owned by three men, 
two of whom owned 30% of each corporation and one of whom owned 
the remaining 40% of each corporation, were incapable of an 
antitrust conspiracy). 
   The plaintiffs contend, without citation to authority, 
that the Interstate Commerce Act does not legally permit a parent 
company shipper to control the affairs of a motor carrier 
subsidiary and requires that a parent shipper and its carrier 
subsidiary conduct their affairs independently of each other.  
The Act, however, neither prohibits such control nor requires 
such independence.  To the contrary, the Act specifically permits 
a shipper to acquire control of a motor carrier in appropriate 
                     
9
.   The defendants correctly point out that Bethlehem Steel 
ultimately determined who held the seven shares it did not own.  
Since the Railroad was a Pennsylvania corporation, under 
Pennsylvania's corporation law, Bethlehem Steel, as the 
Railroad's controlling shareholder, selected the Railroad's 
directors.  The directors, in turn, appointed the Railroad's 
officers, in whose names the seven shares were issued.  15 Pa. 
C.S.A. §§ 1502(a)(16), 1721, 1725(a). 
  
circumstances, 49 U.S.C. § 11343, and in this case, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission sanctioned such control when it 
permitted Bethlehem Steel and the Railroad to acquire Bethran and 
Carrier Express.10 
 We thus hold that the companies in the Bethlehem Steel 
corporate family lacked the capacity to conspire with one another 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 
2. The Alleged Conspiracy Among the Bethlehem Steel 
 Companies, Oak Management, Rediehs, Bryan and Carrier 
 Express Agents                                       
 
 The plaintiffs also assert that a number of unnamed co-
conspirators joined with one another and with the Bethlehem Steel 
companies in various combinations to restrain trade.  We start 
with allegations which suggest that Thomas Rediehs, as an officer 
of Oak Management, and Kermit Bryan, as one of its employees, 
conspired with each other or with the company.  In Copperweld the 
Court made clear that section 1 does not capture coordinated 
activity among the employees and officers of the same firm or 
police "internal agreements" between a corporation and these 
                     
10
.   The plaintiffs further maintain that Copperweld is 
rendered inapplicable by a commitment in the petition Bethlehem 
Steel and the Railroad filed with the Commission to operate 
Bethran and Carrier Express separately, and by the Commission's 
order granting the petition on the "specifically-stated 
condition" of separate operation.  Not only is the plaintiffs' 
characterization of the petition and the Commission's order 
plainly incorrect, but more importantly, under Copperweld, the 
control a parent corporation exercises over its subsidiary is 
relevant, not whether a parent operates the subsidiary 
separately. 
  
individuals.  Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769;  Tunis Bros. Co. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1496 & n.21 (3d Cir. 1985) ("A 
corporation can act only through its agents, thus the acts of 
corporate directors, officers, and employees on behalf of the 
corporation are the acts of the corporation and a corporation 
cannot conspire with itself."), vacated and remanded, 475 U.S. 
1105 (1986), reinstated, 823 F.2d 49 (1987), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 1060 (1988).      
 We turn next to the plaintiffs' theory that a 
conspiracy existed among Carrier Express, its agents in the 
field, and Oak Management, and must determine whether a corporate 
principal and its agents should be treated as one enterprise or 
two.  On another occasion, we were faced with a similar inquiry.  
In Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985), an osteopathic physician brought, 
both individually and as a class representative, an antitrust 
action under, inter alia, section 1 of the Sherman Act against 
the York Hospital, the York Medical and Dental Staff and ten 
individual physicians, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants 
had conspired to deny him staff privileges.  Following trial, the 
jury found that only the staff had conspired against the 
plaintiff class.  Upholding the jury's verdict in this regard, we 
held that the medical staff, comprised of individual, competing 
doctors, satisfied the plurality requirement of section 1, but 
that the staff as an entity, "operat[ing] as an officer of a 
corporation . . . [and having] no interest in competition with 
  
the hospital", could not conspire with the hospital when making a 
staff privilege decision.  Id. at 817. 
 In Pink Supply Corp. v. Hiebert, Inc., 788 F.2d 1313 
(8th Cir. 1986), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held 
that certain types of corporate agents, even if separately 
incorporated, are not capable of conspiring with their principal 
where their relationship necessarily involves a unity of economic 
interest and design.  There, a dealer in office furniture 
manufactured by Hiebert whose dealership had been terminated 
commenced a section 1 antitrust action against Hiebert and four 
of its sales representatives, alleging a price-fixing and boycott 
conspiracy.  At all relevant times, the sales representatives 
served as commissioned sales agents for Hiebert, generating 
business for the manufacturer by persuading potential customers 
to select the Hiebert line.  They did not set prices, arrange 
terms of sales or accept orders, and did not compete in any sense 
with Hiebert or its dealers.  Viewing the sales representatives 
as corporate agents who performed the tasks of employees and 
noting that they were an integral part of the corporate entity, 
the court concluded that Hiebert and the sales agents were so 
closely intertwined in economic interest and purpose as to amount 
to a unified economic consciousness incapable of an antitrust 
conspiracy.  Id. at 1316. 
 When we examine the economic substance of the 
affiliation between Carrier Express and its agents in the field, 
as Copperweld instructs we must, we find a similar unity of 
interest and purpose.  The agents, whose only function was to 
  
make arrangements for the transport of Carrier Express freight 
with authorized carriers, did not compete with Carrier Express.  
As the conduit between Carrier Express and those with trucking 
equipment and drivers, the agents were an essential part of 
Carrier Express operations.  Because the agents received a 
commission from Carrier Express based on the loads they arranged 
for the company to transport, the parties' economic interests 
were entirely congruent.  In our view, therefore, Carrier Express 
and its agents represented a single enterprise. 
 We reach the same conclusion when we consider the 
relationship between Carrier Express and Oak Management.  As 
Carrier Express did not have employees of its own, it used Oak 
Management to handle its day-to-day operations.  Contractually 
obligated to manage Carrier Express affairs, Oak Management was, 
in effect, an inseparable part of Carrier Express' structure.  
Since its fee was a percentage of Carrier Express' revenue, Oak 
Management's economic well being was directly tied to Carrier 
Express' success.  Oak Management did not compete with Carrier 
Express; instead, it stood to gain or lose from overseeing 
Carrier Express operations in an economical and efficient manner, 
as did Carrier Express itself.  Hence, Carrier Express and Oak 
Management constituted one economic unit.  Thus we hold that Oak 
Management and the Carrier Express agents could not conspire with 
Carrier Express or with each other under section 1, or for that 
matter, with Bethran or Bethlehem Steel.   
 
   B. 
  
 Our inquiry into the possibility of a conspiracy 
between Carrier Express and Oak Management, however, does not end 
here.  The plaintiffs argue that even if Carrier Express and Oak 
Management were part of a single enterprise, they were capable of 
conspiring to terminate Siegel Transfer's contract with Carrier 
Express because Oak Management's representatives, Thomas Rediehs 
and Kermit Bryan, each had an interest in Rediehs Express.11  The 
plaintiffs further maintain that Rediehs and Bryan were motivated 
to agree to the contract's termination so that Oak Management 
could replace Russell Siegel as Carrier Express' Baltimore agent.  
          These arguments call into question the exception to the 
general rule that a corporation cannot conspire with its 
employees, officers or agents that we and other courts of appeal 
have recognized.12  In Johnston v. Baker, 445 F.2d 424, 427 (3d 
Cir. 1971), we concluded that a corporation can conspire with its 
agent where the agent acts for "personal reasons."13  Although 
                     
11
.   The plaintiffs do not allege that Rediehs Express 
itself, through Thomas Rediehs, Kermit Bryan or any other person,  
participated in this alleged restraint.  They contend only that 
by virtue of Rediehs' and Bryan's respective interests in Rediehs 
Express, Oak Management was a separate entity with separate 
interests, capable of conspiring with Carrier Express. 
12
.   In Copperweld, the Supreme Court observed without 
comment that "many courts have created an exception for corporate 
officers acting on their own behalf."  467 U.S. at 769-70 n.15, 
citing, inter alia, Johnston v. Baker, 445 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 
1971). 
13
.   In Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985), we noted the exception but 
did not have occasion to discuss it.  Id. at n.43.  We again 
noted the exception in Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 
F.2d 1482, 1496-97 (3d Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 475 U.S. 
1105 (1986), reinstated, 823 F.2d 49 (1987), cert. denied, 484 
  
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Morton Bldgs. of 
Neb. Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 531 F.2d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 
1976), held that the exception arises "when the officers or 
agents were, at the time of the conspiracy, acting beyond the 
scope of their authority or for their own benefit", the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Greenville Pub. Co. v. Daily 
Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974), determined 
that the exception "may be justified when the officer has an 
independent personal stake in achieving the corporation's illegal 
objective." 
 Over time, however, the exception expanded and came 
under criticism for threatening to swallow the general rule.  
Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 705 (4th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992).  See Nurse Midwifery 
Assoc. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605, 613 (6th Cir. 1990), modified by 
927 F.2d 904, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991) (declining to 
adopt the "independent personal stake" exception for substantial 
policy reasons); 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1471d&g 
(1986).  Accordingly, our sister courts refined the exception to 
insure that it is appropriately applied.  In Pink Supply Corp. v. 
Hiebert, Inc., for example, when the plaintiff raised the 
exception, contending that one of Hiebert's sales representatives 
recommended that its dealership be terminated so as to control 
dealer pricing and bolster his own credibility, the Eighth 
(..continued) 
U.S. 1060 (1988), but because the factual issues relating to the 
exception were unresolved, we remanded the case to the district 
court for trial without analyzing the exception further. 
  
Circuit refused to apply the exception, finding an absence of 
evidence in the record that the representative secured a direct 
financial gain from the plaintiff's elimination from the Hiebert 
organization: 
 Our decisions have required more than mere 
speculation regarding the benefit to an agent 
to be realized from participation in a 
conspiracy with the principal. . . .  
Hiebert's sales representatives derived no 
financial benefit from the elimination of 
Pink Supply from the Hiebert organization.  
We construe "for the agent's own benefit" to 
mean at least an economic stake in the gain 
to be realized from the anticompetitive 
object of the conspiracy. 
 
788 F.2d at 1318 (footnote omitted).   
 
 In Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., an antitrust action 
arising out of the revocation of medical staff privileges, the 
plaintiff argued that even if a hospital and its medical staff 
were considered part of the same enterprise and incapable of 
conspiring, the exception applied because the individual doctors 
on the staff had personal stakes in the outcome of the peer 
review process.  Addressing the plaintiff's argument, the Fourth 
Circuit expressly declined to extend the exception beyond the 
rationale underlying its prior decision in Greenville, where the 
president of the defendant company had a financial interest in a 
firm that competed with the plaintiff and the power to control 
the defendant's decisions.  Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 705.  The court 
of appeals thus examined whether the staff included members who 
directly benefitted from the plaintiff's elimination as a 
competitor, and whether the staff caused the hospital to engage 
  
in the alleged restraint.  Id. at 705-06.  Finding that neither 
of these criteria was met, the court concluded that the general 
rule, and not the exception, controlled.  Id.14  
 In our view, in order for the concept of a conspiracy 
between a principal and an agent to apply in the antitrust 
context, the exception to the general rule should arise only 
where an agent acts to further his own economic interest in a 
marketplace actor which benefits from the alleged restraint, and 
                     
14
.   In his antitrust treatise, Professor Phillip E. Areeda 
opines that the exception should, as a general proposition, only 
capture an employee's pursuit of an outside interest which 
competes with the plaintiff.  To do otherwise, Professor Areeda 
maintains, would be unwise given the varied personal interests 
that may motivate employees to act for themselves.  7 PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW § 1471e2 & n.27 (1986). 
 
 Professor Areeda also states that if an employee cannot 
cause the employer to engage in the restraint, an independent 
interest on his part is largely irrelevant to an antitrust 
analysis: 
 
 [T]he employee's "personal stake" bears on 
antitrust policy, if at all, only if it 
brings about an alleged restraint by his 
employer that would not otherwise have 
occurred.  The employer's self-interest may 
have been insufficient to induce the alleged 
restraint in the absence of the "conspiring" 
employee's independent interest.  The 
employee's independent interest is simply 
irrelevant to an employer act that would have 
occurred without regard to it. 
 
  Thus, the premise for finding an 
employer-employee conspiracy is that an 
employee's personal stake causes the employer 
to adopt a restraint that would not otherwise 
have been adopted by the employer in his own 
self-interest.  
 
Id. at § 1471d1. 
  
causes his principal to take the anticompetitive actions about 
which the plaintiff complains.  In this way, the exception 
captures agreements that bring together the economic power of 
actors which were previously pursuing divergent interests and 
goals, the type of activity that section 1 was intended to 
oversee.  Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 752. 
 Our review of the record confirms that the exception as 
we have defined it does not apply in this case.  With regard to 
the respective interests that Rediehs and Bryan had in Rediehs 
Express, the plaintiffs did not offer any evidence to show that 
Rediehs Express competed with Siegel Transfer or that Rediehs 
Express would benefit from Siegel Transfer's elimination from the 
Sparrows Point market.  To the contrary, the defendants presented 
evidence which established that Rediehs Express did not haul 
steel products from Sparrows Point and that the tonnage of 
freight it received from Bethlehem Steel out of Burns Harbor 
declined following termination of Siegel Transfer's contract with 
Carrier Express.  Nor did the plaintiffs proffer any evidence to 
demonstrate that Oak Management, acting through Rediehs and 
Bryan, caused Carrier Express to terminate its contract with 
Siegel Transfer.  Again, the record is to the contrary, showing 
that James Matthews, Carrier Express' Vice President, possessed 
and retained the authority to decide such matters, and indeed 
exercised that authority in favor of contract termination.  At 
  
most, Oak Management was asked to give Carrier Express advice.15  
The giving of advice, however, when requested by the decision 
maker, is not equivalent to making the decision.  Pennsylvania 
Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n., 745 F.2d 248, 259 (3d Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985).   
 We also reject the plaintiffs' alternative argument 
regarding Rediehs' and Bryan's purported desire for Carrier 
Express' Baltimore agency.  First, the record conclusively 
establishes that neither Rediehs nor Bryan sought the agency, and 
that Rediehs only reluctantly accepted it on Oak Management's 
behalf at Carrier Express' request.  Second, Oak Management had 
nothing to gain, and indeed did not gain, from Siegel's ouster as 
a Carrier Express agent.  Third, any losses that Siegel 
personally may have sustained are not relevant to the plaintiffs' 
case.  Finally, Siegel's termination as a Carrier Express agent 
was a natural consequence of contract termination, an event that 
Oak Management did not cause or control. 
 
 V. 
 When we apply our conclusions regarding conspiratorial 
capacity to the evidence, and evaluate the undisputed facts of 
record, we find that the plaintiffs have failed to offer proof 
sufficient to establish the element of concerted action.  With 
respect to their allegations that Bethlehem Steel, Bethran, 
                     
15
.   The record shows that Rediehs advised Carrier Express 
not to terminate its contract with Siegel Transfer, and that 
Bryan did not offer any advice one way or the other. 
  
Carrier Express and Oak Management conspired on January 4, 1990 
to end Siegel Transfer's contract with Carrier Express, we 
conclude that these companies constituted one economic unit which 
met to announce Carrier Express' decision to terminate the 
agreement.  With regard to the plaintiffs' contention that Oak 
Management's instructions to Carrier Express' agents not to make 
transportation arrangements with Siegel Transfer constitute 
evidence of a conspiracy to exclude Siegel Transfer from the 
Sparrows Point market, we hold that this activity was undertaken 
by a single enterprise in order to implement the contract's 
termination. 
 As to the plaintiffs' complaint that the defendants 
combined with other parties to refuse Siegel Transfer the 
opportunity to haul freight for Bethlehem Steel, we find nothing 
more in the record than a unilateral, and under the antitrust 
laws, lawful choice on the part of one of Bethlehem Steel's 
transportation superintendents not to use Siegel equipment to 
transport products out of the company's Sparrow Point mill.  
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 
(1984) (A buyer or a seller "generally has the right to deal, or 
refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so 
independently.").  In addition, the record is uncontroverted that 
Bethlehem Steel, through other transportation managers, did 
indeed permit carriers with whom the company had direct business 
ties to use Siegel equipment to haul Bethlehem Steel freight 
after Carrier Express' termination of the Siegel Transfer 
contract.  Further, although the plaintiffs suggested in their 
  
brief that Rediehs Express assisted Carrier Express in a 
"horizontal restraint", they did not present a factual basis for 
this belief.  As we have stated, "[l]egal memoranda and oral 
argument are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a 
factual dispute sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion."  
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Township, 772 F.2d 1103, 
1109 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986). 
 Lastly, we conclude that the plaintiffs' contention 
that the refund contract between Carrier Express and Bethlehem 
Steel represents a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act lacks merit.  Because the only parties to the contract were 
members of the Bethlehem Steel corporate family, the requisite 
element of concerted action is missing.  Moreover, we do not find 
any support for the plaintiffs' theory that a per se violation of 
the antitrust laws can be stated merely by alleging that an 
otherwise lawful arrangement is contrary to the "pro-competitive" 
polices of the Interstate Commerce Act.   
 
 VI. 
 In Count XI of the amended complaint, the plaintiffs 
claim that the defendants violated the Interstate Commerce Act 
and the Elkins Act.  According to the plaintiffs, Siegel 
Transfer's contract with Carrier Express was an unlawful 
"brokerage" agreement which improperly provided a "commission" to 
Carrier Express and a "rebate" to Bethlehem Steel; the refund 
agreement between Carrier Express and Bethlehem Steel amounted to 
another unlawful "rebate"; and Bethlehem Steel impermissibly 
  
owned and controlled the operations of Bethran and Carrier 
Express. 
 Congress gave the Interstate Commerce Commission 
primary responsibility to enforce the Interstate Commerce Act, 
authorizing it to investigate infractions, compel compliance 
where violations have occurred, bring civil actions to enjoin 
certain violations, and enforce its orders and regulations.  49 
U.S.C. § 11702.  The Act also authorizes the Attorney General to 
enforce the Act upon the Commission's request, and to bring civil 
actions against common carriers for discriminatory practices.  49 
U.S.C. § 11703.  
           In only a limited number of sections of the Act does 
Congress allow a private party to file suit in a court of law.16 
The plaintiffs do not cite to any of these sections in Count XI, 
nor do they apply in this case.   
 The other private action currently permitted under the 
Act involves "undercharge" claims, the allegation by a common 
carrier that it received a lower rate from a shipper than that 
filed with the Commission.  See, e.g., Maislin Industries, U.S. 
                     
16
.   Section 11704 permits an interested person to enjoin an 
abandonment of service; section 11705 provides a private right of 
action to one injured in specified ways by certain carriers; 
section 11707 permits a private action against a common carrier 
for liability under receipts and bills of lading; and section 
11708 allows a person to sue to enforce the Act's provisions 
relating to the issuance of operating certificates and permits.  
49 U.S.C. §§ 11704-11705, 11707-11708.  
 
  We note also that the plaintiffs did not raise the 
question of an implied right of action under either the 
Interstate Commerce Act or the Elkins Act. 
  
v. Primary Steel, 497 U.S. 116 (1990).  Because contract carriers 
are exempt from the tariff filing and uniform rate requirements 
of the Act, Central and Southern Motor Freight Tariff Assoc., 
Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 1019 (1985), there is no basis for an undercharge claim 
in this, a motor contract carrier case.   
 The Elkins Act, the other statute upon which the 
plaintiffs rely, does not regulate motor contract carriers or 
provide for private remedies.  49 U.S.C. §§ 11901-11903, 11915-
11916.   
 We therefore find that the district court correctly 
dismissed the plaintiffs' federal transportation law claims for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because neither the 
Interstate Commerce Act nor the Elkins Act grants the plaintiffs 
the right to pursue their allegations in a federal court.  
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 
(1986) (the existence of a private cause of action is a 
jurisdictional requirement). 
  
   VII. 
 We turn finally to the plaintiffs' state law claims.  
Because the plaintiffs failed to establish the antitrust claim 
they brought under federal law, their Maryland Antitrust Act 
claim also fails.  Natural Design, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 302 Md. 47, 
53, 485 A.2d 663, 666 (1984) (the Maryland courts follow the 
federal courts' interpretations of section 1 of the Sherman Act 
when evaluating state antitrust claims).  Likewise, the 
  
plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim is deficient for failing to 
establish that the defendants engaged in an unlawful conspiracy.  
Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 211, 412 A.2d 
466, 472 (1979) (under Pennsylvania law, the essential elements 
of civil conspiracy include malice and proof of a combination or 
agreement by two or more persons to do an unlawful act or to use 
unlawful means to accomplish an otherwise lawful act).17   
 In their breach of contract claim, the plaintiffs 
contend that Carrier Express' January 4, 1990 notice of contract 
termination was ineffective because the contract required that 
notice be given by December 4, thirty days before the contract's 
January 4 renewal date.  The defendants argue that the contract 
renewed from year to year, with resulting yearly obligations, but 
that the year term could be cut short at any time by either party 
upon proper notice.18  
                     
17
.   The district court analyzed the civil conspiracy claim 
under Pennsylvania law.  On appeal, both parties applied 
Pennsylvania law to this claim. 
18
.   The contract's termination provision provided: 
 
 (13) This AGREEMENT is to become effective 
January 4, 1986 and shall remain in effect 
for a period of three yrs from such date, and 
from year to year thereafter, subject to the 
right of either party hereto to cancel or 
terminate the AGREEMENT at any time upon not 
less than thirty (30) days written notice of 
one party to the other.  (emphasis in 
original). 
 
  
 In Maryland,19 the courts interpret written contracts 
that are clear and unambiguous.  Rothman v. Silver, 245 Md. 292, 
296, 226 A.2d 308, 309 (1967).  The cardinal rule in the 
interpretation of contracts is that effect must be given to the 
intention of the parties, Kasten Constr. Co., Inc. v. Rod 
Enterprises, Inc., 268 Md. 318, 328, 301 A.2d 12, 18 (1973), and 
to all provisions of the agreement.  Rothman, 245 Md. at 296, 226 
A.2d at 309.  When the language of a contract is clear, the true 
test of what is meant is not what one of the parties to the 
contract understood it to mean, but what a reasonable person in 
the position of the parties would have thought it meant.  Kasten 
Constr., 268 Md. at 329, 301 A.2d at 18.   
 In our view, the plaintiffs' interpretation of the 
contract is strained, ignores the "at any time" termination 
language and adds a notice period that the contract did not have.  
The defendants' interpretation, on the other hand, is reasonable 
and gives meaning to all of the contract's provisions.  We 
therefore find that the district court did not err in holding 
that the defendants' January 4, 1990 notice of termination 
complied with the terms of the parties' contract. 
 The plaintiffs also argue that Carrier Express failed 
to honor the thirty-day notice period.  The record and the 
contract itself belie this argument.  On January 4, 5 and 12, 
1990, Carrier Express offered Siegel Transfer more than 600,000 
                     
19
.   The district court determined that Maryland law applies 
to the plaintiffs' contract claims.  Neither party disagreed with 
the court's choice of law on appeal. 
  
pounds of freight to transport.  While the plaintiffs contend 
that arrangements for transport of this freight were made prior 
to January 1, 1990, the fact remains that Carrier Express' offer 
and Siegel Transfer's transport occurred in January 1990.  The 
plaintiffs also assert that the parties' agreement required a 
minimum of twenty-five loads a day.  To the contrary, the 
contract expressly obligated Carrier Express to offer "a minimum 
quantity of 30,000 pounds per year for each year this Agreement 
remains in effect."20   
 Finally, we agree with the district court that the 
plaintiffs' claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith 
must fail because the claim amounts to no more than an 
impermissible attempt on their part to alter the termination 
provision of the contract.  Parker v. Columbia Bank, 91 Md. App. 
346, 365, 604 A.2d 521, 531 (1992) (the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing is an implied term, but this duty "simply prohibits 
one party to a contract from acting in such a manner as to 
prevent the party from performing his obligations . . . ."). 
 
 VIII. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's grant of summary judgment on Counts I, II, III, IV, VII, 
                     
20
.   The plaintiffs' additional claim that the contract was 
not a "trip lease" and their discussion regarding the necessary 
elements of a motor carrier agreement under the Interstate 
Commerce Act are not relevant, and do not alter the fact that the 
defendants properly exercised the termination right they had 
under the contract. 
  
VIII and XI in the defendants' favor, and the court's dismissal 
of the federal claims in Count XI of the plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint. 
 
